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Abstract
The main part of Japanese aid is directed to Asia and there has been a strong emphasis on economic
infrastructure, that is building railways, roads and ports etc. Recently however there is a refocusing towards
environmental aid and ￿softer￿ types of aid such as poverty alleviation and social infrastructure. ODA that
used to be based on the request from the recipient countries has become much more politicised, with Japan
itself making country assistance plans indicating what fields they are willing to provide aid in. This is not
always popular with the recipient government as in the case of China. In this case it has actually made
Japan￿s already complex relation with China even more complicated.
The paper will start with a short historic review of Japanese ODA policy and the characteristics of Japanese
aid. This will be followed by an explanation of the changes going on in Japanese foreign aid policy and
finally we will see how this how this effect aid to China and the role of aid in the future Japan-China
relationship.
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Changes in Japanese Foreign Aid Policy
By Associate Professor Marie S￿derberg-EIJS, Stockholm School of Economics
(JAPMS@hhs.se)
Japan was the world￿s largest donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA)
1 between 1990 and year
2000. Due to the sever fiscal situation in Japan foreign aid is now, since two year back, being cut by 10
percent a year. The U.S. has regained its position as the top donor and announced further increases in aid
spending. The European Union has also set new goals of increasing spending. This makes Japanese
government officials worry about influence wane. At the time of the World Summit on Sustainable
Development in Johannesburg Yomiuri Shimbun had an article on how reduced ODA as well as a delayed
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol had destroyed Japan￿s dream of playing a leading role at the summit.
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At the same time as the budget is cut and the slogan of valuing ￿quality over quantity￿ is heard more
frequently there are substantial changes being undertaken in Japanese foreign aid.
The main part of Japanese aid is directed to Asia and there has been a strong emphasis on economic
infrastructure, that is building railways, roads and ports etc. Recently however there is a refocusing towards
environmental aid and ￿softer￿ types of aid such as poverty alleviation and social infrastructure. ODA that
used to be based on the request from the recipient countries has become much more politicised, with Japan
itself making country assistance plans indicating what fields they are willing to provide aid in. This is not
always popular with the recipient government as in the case of China. In this case it has actually made
Japan￿s already complex relation with China even more complicated.
The paper will start with a short historic review of Japanese ODA policy and the characteristics of Japanese
aid. This will be followed by an explanation of the changes going on in Japanese foreign aid policy and
finally we will see how this how this effect aid to China and the role of aid in the future Japan-China
relationship.3
A short historic Review of Japanese Foreign Aid
In 1994, Japan celebrated, according to the Foreign Ministry, the 40th anniversary of its ODA
program.
3 But since the term ODA (see footnote 1) was first used by OECD in 1969, one has
to assume that Japan meant the 40th anniversary of its foreign aid program, or rather its
program of economic co-operation (keizai kyō ryoku), a terminology most commonly used in
Japan. Economic co-operation is a wider concept consisting of three parts that besides aid
(ODA) includes other official flows (OOF
4) and private direct investment. It is within this
framework that Japanese aid is firmly placed.
Japan￿s contribution of USD 50,000 to the Colombo plan in 1954 together with the
war reparation agreements with Burma in 1954, the Philippines in 1956 and Indonesia in 1958
are seen as the origin of Japan￿s aid program. The war reparations were given to build up
what had been damaged during WW II. It was tied to procurement from Japanese companies,
and in that way it also served the purpose of promoting exports from Japan. In 1957, the yen
loans from the Export-Import Bank started. They went mainly to Asia, and besides filling
certain needs in the developing countries they also served the purpose of establishing
Japanese industry in the area. Aid in the 1960s was almost exclusively directed towards Asia
and overwhelmingly served Japan￿s commercial purposes. This pattern changed with the oil
crisis of 1973 when a huge aid-package began for the Arab world to secure the supply of oil.
As a consequence of this crisis, a stable supply of natural resources became another ingredient
of Japanese aid policy.
Trade was a prerequisite to obtaining resources, and Japan recognized its
interdependence with developing countries and a certain amount of infrastructure was needed
to conduct such trade. This is one of the reasons for the huge amount of aid money being
spent on infrastructure development in Asia. It was seen as a necessary cost for achieving a
secure and peaceful world as well as Japan’s own economic development. Humanitarian
considerations, as a reason for aid, did not appear with any weight until the late 1970s.4
In 1977, the first of a number of aid doubling plans was announced. The wish to be
respected in the international community was another motive for those plans that eventually
turned Japan into a leading donor. It was also a way of improving Japan’s image in Asia
where Japanese businessmen had left far from favourable impressions of their country. This
was the start of the gift-giving diplomacy (omiage gaikō ), which Japanese Prime Ministers
touring Asia has extensively used.
The Characteristics of Japanese Aid
During the 1990s, Japan was the world’s biggest donor of ODA in absolute terms.
However, in terms of percentage of GNP the figures are much less impressive. Japanese ODA
in 1998 was 0.28 per cent of GNP
5, which was bellow average among DAC countries. Still it
was a considerable increase compared with 1996 when it was only 0.20 per cent of GNP, one
of the lowest figures among the DAC countries. When it comes to the quality of aid (as
measured in purely economic terms, by grant share and grant element), Japan has performed
very poorly. This clearly demonstrates one of the peculiarities of Japanese aid: it is to a large
extent based on loans and the recipients are expected to repay them although the loans come
with a long grace period and a low interest rate.
A significant difference between Japanese loan aid and that distributed by others
(mostly multilateral organisations) is its limited staff number. OECF, the organization
distributing Japanese ODA-loans in the 1990s, used to have a staff of around 300 people. The
World Bank with loans slightly more than double those of OECF, has a staff of around 6000.
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Another characteristic of Japanese aid is its heavy emphasis on Asia. In 1998, 62.4 per
cent of all bilateral aid went to Asia. Asian countries receive the main part of their aid in the
form of loans, receiving a total of 91.5 per cent of all the loan-aid. The number one recipient
on a cumulative basis is Indonesia. China has a much shorter history of receiving aid but is
quickly catching up and was the largest recipient during much of the 1990s.5
A comparison of the content of Japanese ODA with other countries clearly shows an
emphasis on economic infrastructure development (39 per cent of total). Within the category
of economic infrastructure, transport receives the largest amount of ODA. A total of 23.5 per
cent of Japanese ODA is in this sector.
In the 1990￿s, Japanese ODA, at least verbally, became more politicised and more
environmentally conscious. The ￿ODA Charter￿, which was adopted in 1992, called for the
consideration of the following principles in aid implementation.
1.  Environmental conservation and development should be pursued in tandem.
2.  Any use of ODA for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts should
be avoided.
3.  Full attention should be given to trends in recipient countries’ military expenditure, their
development and production of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, their export
and import of arms.
4.  Full attention should be given to efforts for promoting democratisation and the
introduction of a market oriented economy, and the situation regarding the securing of
basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient country.
These principles were well in line with the policy of other major donors at the time. That
Indonesia and China have remained the main recipients of Japanese ODA after the adoption
of this charter makes it very clear that it is not the performance in these areas that are decisive
in Japan￿s decision to extend aid or not. It is the trends in these areas that the Japanese
authorities claim that they are watching. The validity of the first principle as such can be
questioned as Japanese ODA has a strong emphasis on economic infrastructure development
and such projects usually implies a certain amount of environmental destruction.
  The third principle has been applied, to a certain extent, in connection with Chinese
nuclear tests, which led to a temporary stop of a minor part of the aid-flow (see below).6
Policy Changes
In its latest five-year medium-term policy document on ODA, announced in August
1999, the future approach and priority issues are outlined. Japan will emphasis DACs
"Development Partnership Strategy" in which the improvement of living standards of all
humankind is the main objective of development co-operation. A number of specific goals for
social development are also formulated. They include a reduction by one half the proportion
of people living in extreme poverty, provision of universal primary education, and the
elimination of gender disparity in education. The key to realizing these goals lies in self-help
efforts as developing countries work towards economic take-off. The importance of
improving the environment for private sector activities and inflow of private funds is
emphasized, as is increased opportunities for Japanese business to participate in ODA projects
as well as further coordination between the different forms of economic co-operation (that is
ODA, OOF and private investment).
According to this policy document, special "country assistance programs" are to be
formulated for major recipients. The programs will specify the significance of the assistance
provided by Japan, its basic objectives, the priority issues and fields and the forms of
assistance to be deployed. These programs will take into account coordination with other
donors as well as the private sector.
This is a considerable change from the earlier policy of approving ODA on a request
basis. It will further strengthen the Japanese influence on how its aid money will be used and
therefore it might not be so popular among the recipients. It also implies that there will be
stronger co-operation between the two implementing agencies: JICA (that deals with the grant
aid and technical assistance) and JBIC
7 (that is in charge of the loan aid as well as OOF ).7
The Japanese-Chinese ODA Relationship from Past to Present
War reparation from Japan was never paid to the Peoples Republic of China although they
suffered under the Japanese aggression. After WW II both the Peoples Republic of China and
Taiwan renounced reparations. The Japanese Peace Treaty was not signed by the Peoples
Republic of China in 1951 and a year later Japan, an ally of the Untied States, signed a treaty
with Taiwan. From the inception of its aid program, Japan extended assistance to Taiwan.
This continued until the initiation of Japan￿s diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of
China in 1972.
An ODA program to the Peoples Republic of China commenced after the declaration
of an open door policy and Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi￿s visit to China in 1979. Since
that time ODA has grown enormously. Between 1982 and 1986, China was the single largest
recipient of ODA from Japan. The incident at Tiananmen Square in 1989 led to a temporary
cessation of ODA, but aid was soon resumed, Japan being the first nation to restore friendly
relations with China
8. In August 1989 it lifted the freeze on ongoing projects and in October
that year the World Bank resumed its lending to China for humanitarian aid. After that, Japan
extended grant aid and in July 1990 it announced that all aid would gradually be resumed.
Soon after that other industrialised countries followed one after another. Since then China has
remained as one of the major, if not the top, recipient of Japanese aid.
On a bilateral level Japan has been the largest contributor of ODA to China. It has
usually contributed twice as much as the second donor and often more than the largest
multilateral donor IDA of the World Bank.
The largest part of the aid is given in the form of loans. This has made up 75 per cent
of the total aid. The loans have been announced in the form of four packages of five year each
9, matching with the Chinese five-year plans. In fact, the Japanese loan-aid has been provided
only to projects included in the Chinese own plans. This is a strong deviation from Japan￿s8
regular budgetary procedures of annual commitments. This is a special treatment that has
been extended only to China.
The five-year packages have all been orally announced by Japanese Prime Ministers to
Chinese leaders on different occasions. This can be seen as a proof of the political importance
of ODA loans to China. Such matters are not delegated to the bureaucracy to handle but are
presented by Japanese Prime Ministers in connection with meetings where other matters are
also discussed.
The first two packages of ODA loans (1979-1984: 331 billion yen and 1984-1989: 540
billion yen) were characterized by the fact that financing for transportation infrastructure
project, particularly for coal transportation had been emphasised. In the third package (1990-
1995: 810 billion yen) the scope was somewhat broader as was the number of projects. In
addition to transportation projects there were water supply and sanitation, gas supply,
communication projects to link together several cities, fertilizer plant projects and
infrastructure projects in economic development zones.
The concession by the Japanese to accommodate the Chinese five-year plans has a
number of practical implications. One of these is that it has been difficult to make major
changes during this period even if the priorities of Japanese ODA policy changes.
When the Japanese ODA charter was adopted in 1992 it could not be applied to the
content of the third yen loan package as this had already been approved. That is one of the
reasons why the Japanese side now has decided to abandon the five-year package system and
provide Japanese ODA on a yearly basis from 2001.
The Chinese nuclear testing in 1995, which was in direct violation of Article 3 of the
ODA Charter, led to a temporary ￿freeze￿ of Japanese grant aid. This was partly due to a
strong local opinion in Japan against the testing. As grants are only around six per cent of the
total aid, it did not effect the amount of aid to China in any major way. The freeze was ended9
when the testing was over in 1997. The withholding of aid while China was making nuclear
tests created a lot of bad will in China. The Chinese saw this as a major change from the days
when aid was given partly for geopolitical reasons such as a strong Japanese interest in
Chinese natural resources and its market and partly as a compensation for the war reparations
that were never paid
10. It was also a deviation of the old Japanese policy of trying to separate
politics from economics (seikei bunrei).
In a Japanese climate where foreign aid, and especially that directed to China, is being
questioned, there have been attempts to use ODA to put power behind Japanese demands in
other areas. The most recent example is the special yen-loans for the ￿Beijing Urban Railway
Construction Project￿ and the ￿Xi￿an Xianyang International Airport Terminal Expansion
Project￿ (17.2 billion yen). Agreement was supposed to be reached in the summer of 2000, but
although there was no formal freeze, procedure was slowed down due to opposition raised in
the ruling Liberal Democratic Parties foreign affairs committee. The main reason for the
opposition was that these were strictly economic infrastructure projects, which were no longer
a priority area for Japanese ODA. However, there were also voices that opposed due to the
increase of Chinese naval vessel activities in Japans exclusive economic zone, which were
perceived as a military threat.
11 Foreign Minister Kono Yohei brought up this issue during his
visit to China in August and at that time the two countries agreed to set up a formal
notification mechanism for naval vessels entering into their respective exclusive economic
zones. On September 7 the foreign affairs panel members approved the loans, and final
signing took place in Beijing on October 10 2000 just before the Chinese Prime Minister Zhus
Rongjis￿ visit to Japan.
This new tendency of using aid as a leverage in discussion on other issues is likely to
lead to friction in the future. During his visit the Chinese Prime Minister warned Japan against10
using ODA to China as a diplomatic card.
12 In China, such actions are seen as an attempt to
intervene in their domestic affairs.
Policy Changes
The fourth yen loan package (1996-2000: 580 billion yens for the first three years and 390
billion for the following two), in addition to the economic infrastructure undertaken so far,
emphasized the environment and agriculture and in terms of regional development, the
development of the inland.
Environmental preservation, put forward as a priority area for Japanese ODA in
general, received a share of 16 per cent of the yen loans. A majority of the projects in the last
two years of the forth yen loan package, 18 out of 28, were directed at the inland area.
Figures from OECD
13 show that the Peoples Republic of China was the single largest
recipient country of ODA in 1998. It received 2.4 billion US dollars, 6.7 per cent of all ODA.
Japan is the main provider of ODA to China at present. A problem with it is that it is not all
that popular in Japan. Neither is ODA in general. Aid to China has been in the center of the
debate. Articles like the one by Komori Yoshiki in Chū ō  Kō ron 
14 has pointed out how it
has been used to build luxurious subways that very few people use in Beijing whereas people
in Tokyo have to put up with old and very crowded one. He compares the Beijing airport with
its 51 elevators with the much smaller crowded Narita airport in Tokyo, suggesting that the
Japanese government should rather think of their own taxpayers than wasting money in
China. Others have also suggested substantial changes in Japanese aid to China.
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 According to the present plan for ODA, Japan is to formulate a ￿country assistance
program￿ for all the major recipients. MOFA (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) is in charge of
formulating such a program and it started to do so for China three years ago. Due to severe
criticism of the aid to China in the mass media and the political debate on the aid to China11
even within the governing LDP party formation of the program was stopped
16. The main
points of criticism were that:
•   China itself is an aid-providing country and does not need to be a recipient country.
•   Japan￿s aid to China is not visible to the Chinese people.
•   Aid projects are not properly evaluated.
•   Aid allows the Chinese government to allocate more of its budget to a military build up.
•   China must take its own initiative in solving problems such as poverty
To solve the deadlock over the country assistance program to China a round table conference
composed of 15 people from academia, the private sector and non-governmental
organizations was organized to give advice. In their report published in December 2000
17 they
suggested radical changes of Japanese ODA. These were adopted as official policy in the
Autumn of 2001.
Aid decisions should be made according to the conditions at the time and how well the
project matches with development priorities in the country assistance program. This is a
radical change. Before the change China, as well as many of the other recipient countries in
Asia, has known roughly how much money to expect every year. Now China has to come up
with suggestions that are considered interesting enough for Japan to support and can not take
for granted that they will get a certain support.
Concerning the priority areas, a move from infrastructure development in the coast
areas towards more environmental and social infrastructure in the inland is adopted and the
focus on inland and environment has been be sharpened. There is also a decision of more
￿soft￿ type of aid such as help to strengthen the legal framework for economic transactions as
well as good governance. Other priority areas are an increase of mutual understanding
through an increase in exchanges on a number of levels, poverty alleviation and different12
measures to support Japanese business interests in China. Money is also put aside for the
specific purpose of making the Japanese aid visible in the form of advertisements etc.
This new policy became clearly visible when ODA yen loans were extended in March 2002.
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Of the 15 ODA loan commitments, seven projects or 54% of the total loan amount (161,366
million yen) are for the environmental protection. Six projects or 19% are for the higher
education projects, two projects or 27% of the total loan amount are for the regional
development projects.  Of the 15 ODA loan commitments, 13 projects or 85% of the total
loan amount are for inland region assistance projects and are expected to narrow the income
gap between the coastal and inland regions in a comprehensive way.
The Role of Aid in the Future Relationship
As for ODA to China, it seems that the Japanese government is now trying to take the
initiative over what projects that its aid money is used for. Up to now the decisions with
regard to the most important projects for economic development has been done by the
Chinese government. Now there is a new thinking that it is Japan that should set the priority
areas according to their own policy and that Japan’s own national interests also should be
taken into consideration
19. One sign of this is the cessation of the five-year loan-aid packages
coordinated with the Chinese five-year plans. Another is the emphasis on environment and
anti-poverty measures, the areas that are not necessarily the main priorities of the Chinese
government.
On the political level, ODA will continue to be of importance in the two countries￿
relationship. Japanese Prime Ministers are likely to continue with their gift giving diplomacy
in connection with meetings with Chinese leaders where other matters are also discussed. In a
sense ODA will have the function of being the glue that keeps the relations together.
The positive way of using ODA, having it as a proverbial carrot, will still be
important. The negative use, such as freezing grant aid in connection with Chinese nuclear13
testing, is likely to cause frictions. The Chinese continued the testing according to its own
schedule and the freeze of aid only created a lot of ill feelings and a sense of distrust. The
prolonging of the procedure for the special yen loans in the summer of year 2000 is an
example of how the public opinion at home can make Japanese politicians use ODA to make
their protests against Chinese behaviour heard. This way of using aid is quite risky however,
as it might arise anti-Japanese feelings. The internal debate in Japan on ODA to China has
also clearly revealed Japanese sentiments towards China
20. To a certain extent ODA has
already become another ￿issue￿ between the two countries.
Japan has strong motivations for wanting to integrate China into the world community
and help it prosper rather than trying to isolate it and impose sanctions. One, Japan is one of
the main holders of Chinese debt. Two, a policy of isolation would most likely also hurt
Japanese business interests and, three, it might create instability in China, which is something
Japan would not like to have.
Still, there is a great need for capital in China as there are many projects that need
financing. Japanese ODA loans are one of the most favourable ones available on a large scale,
since IDA of the World Bank stopped theirs. This makes it likely that the Chinese will read
the Japanese country assistance plan carefully and try to squeeze some of the projects they
already have in the pipeline into the different priority areas so that they will be eligible for
aid. To a certain extent they will agree to Japanese ODA loans even for projects that might
not be their highest priority. The interest is likely to decrease as conditions are increasing
however and in no way, will they let Japan govern their development process.
In the future there is likely to be a decrease of ODA considering the policy changes
and the severe fiscal situation in Japan as well as the fact that China has reached a higher
developmental level itself and has a booming economy. It should be pointed out that although
China is the largest recipient ODA, it only amounted to 0,2 per cent of Chinese GNP, which is14
rather low.
21 Foreign direct investment and trade will grow in importance and there will be an
increase in OOF instead of ODA. This will be the case especially in the coastal areas, that is
not a priority area of ODA any longer, but where there is a great interest from the Japanese
business community. Conditions might be less favourable for OOF than for ODA, but this is a
field were there is less transparency and Japanese business interests can more easily be
promoted.
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